Justice Joseph Story on Rules of Constitutional Interpretation (1833)

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  The following is from:  Joseph Story, LL.D., Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States [...] Abridged by the Author, for the Use of Colleges and High Schools (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company/Cambridge: Brown, Shattuck, and Co., 1833), Chapter 5: Rules of Interpretation, pp. 134-148, 154-162.  Text has been further abridged.]


    § 178.  In our future commentaries upon the constitution we shall treat it, then, as it is denominated in the instrument itself, as a CONSTITUTION of government, ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves and their posterity.  They have declared it the supreme law of the land.  They have made it a limited government.  They have defined its authority.  They have restrained it to the exercise of certain powers, and reserved all others to the states or to the people.  It is a popular government.  Those, who administer it, are responsible to the people.  It is as popular, and just as much emanating from the people, as the state governments.  It is created for one purpose; the state governments for another.  It may be altered, and amended, and abolished at the will of the people.  In short, it was made by the people, made for the people, and is responsible to the people.

    § 179.  In this view of the matter, let us now proceed to consider the rules, by which it ought to be interpreted; for if these rules are correctly laid down, it will save us from many embarrassments in examining and defining its powers.  Much of the difficulty, which has arisen in all the public discussions on this subject, has had its origin in the want of some uniform rules of interpretation, expressly or tacitly agreed on by the disputants.  Very different doctrines on this point have been adopted by different commentators; and not unfrequently very different language held by the same parties at different periods.  In short, the rules of interpretation have often been shifted to suit the emergency; and the passions and prejudices of the day, or the favor and odium of a particular measure, have not unfrequently furnished a mode of argument, which would, on the one hand, leave the constitution crippled and inanimate, or, on the other hand, give it an extent and elasticity, subversive of all rational boundaries.

    § 180.  Let us, then, endeavor to ascertain, what are the true rules of interpretation applicable to the constitution; so that we may have some fixed standard, by which to measure its powers, and limit its prohibitions, and guard its obligations, and enforce its securities of our rights and liberties.

    § 181.  I.  The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties.  Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked, that the intention of a law is to be gathered from the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the reason and spirit of the law.  He goes on to justify the remark by stating, that words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification, not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use; that if words happen to be dubious, their meaning may be established by the context, or by comparing them with other words and sentences in the same instrument; that illustrations may be further derived from the subject-matter, with reference to which the expressions are used; that the effect and consequence of a particular construction is to be examined, because, if a literal meaning would involve a manifest absurdity, it ought not to be adopted; and that the reason and spirit of the law, or the causes, which led to its enactment, are often the best exponents of the words, and limit their application.

    § 182.  Where the words are plain and clear, and the sense distinct and perfect arising on them, there is generally no necessity to have recourse to other means of interpretation.  It is only, when there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from other sources, that interpretation has its proper office.  There may be obscurity, as to the meaning, from the doubtful character of the words used, from other clauses in the same instrument, or from an incongruity or repugnancy between the words, and the apparent intention derived from the whole structure of the instrument, or its avowed object.  In all such cases interpretation becomes indispensable.

    § 183.  II.  In construing the constitution of the United States, we are, in the first instance, to consider, what are its nature and objects, its scope and design, as apparent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also viewed in its component parts.  Where its words are plain, clear, and determinate, they require no interpretation; and it should, therefore, be admitted, if at all, with great caution, and only from necessity, either to escape some absurd consequence, or to guard against some fatal evil.  Where the words admit of two senses, each of which is conformable to common usage, that sense is to be adopted, which, without departing from the literal import of the words, best harmonizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design of the instrument.  Where the words are unambiguous, but the provision may cover more or less ground according to the intention, which is yet subject to conjecture; or where it may include in its general terms more or less, than might seem dictated by the general design, as that may be gathered from other parts of the instrument, there is much more room for controversy; and the argument from inconvenience will probably have different influences upon different minds.  Whenever such questions arise, they will probably be settled, each upon its own peculiar grounds; and whenever it is a question of power, it should be approached with infinite caution, and affirmed only upon the most persuasive reasons.  In examining the constitution, the antecedent situation of the country, and its institutions, the existence and operations of the state governments, the powers and operations of the confederation, in short all the circumstances, which had a tendency to produce, or to obstruct its formation and ratification, deserve a careful attention.  Much, also, may be gathered from contemporary history, and contemporary interpretation, to aid us in just conclusions.

    § 184.  Contemporary construction is properly resorted to, to illustrate, and confirm the text, to explain a doubtful phrase, or to expound an obscure clause; and in proportion to the uniformity and universality of that construction, and the known ability and talents of those, by whom it was given, is the credit, to which it is entitled.  It can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter away its obvious sense; it can never narrow down its limitations; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries.

    § 185.  And, after all, the most unexceptionable source of collateral interpretation is from the practical expositions of the government itself in its various departments upon particular questions, discussed and settled upon their own single merits.  These approach the nearest in their own nature to judicial expositions; and have the same general recommendation, that belongs to the latter.  They are decided upon solemn argument, pro re natâ, upon a doubt raised, upon a lis mota, upon a deep sense of their importance and difficulty, in the face of the nation, with a view to present action, in the midst of jealous interests, and by men capable of urging, or repelling the grounds of argument, from their exquisite genius, their comprehensive learning, or their deep meditation upon the absorbing topic.  How light, compared with these means of instruction, are the private lucubrations of the closet, or the retired speculations of ingenious minds, intent on theory, or general views, and unused to encounter a practical difficulty at every step!

    § 186.  But to return to the rules of interpretation, arising ex directo from the text of the constitution.  And first the rules to be drawn from the nature of the instrument.  (1.) It is to be construed, as a frame, or fundamental law of government, established by the PEOPLE of the United States, according to their own free pleasure and sovereign will.  In this respect it is in no wise distinguishable from the constitutions of the state governments.  Each of them is established by the people for their own purposes, and each is founded on their supreme authority.  The powers, which are conferred, the restrictions, which are imposed, the authorities, which are exercised, the organization and distribution thereof, which are provided, are in each case for the same object, the common benefit of the governed, and not for the profit or dignity of the rulers.

    § 187.  If this be the true view of the subject, the constitution of the United States is to receive as favorable a construction, as those of the states.  Neither is to be construed alone; but each with a reference to the other.  Each belongs to the same system of government; each is limited in its powers; and within the scope of its powers each is supreme.  Each, by the theory of our government, is essential to the existence and due preservation of the powers and obligations of the other.  The destruction of either would be equally calamitous, since it would involve the ruin of that beautiful fabric of balanced government, which has been reared with so much care and wisdom, and in which the people have reposed their confidence, as the truest safeguard of their civil, religious, and political liberties.  The exact limits of the powers, confided by the people to each, may not always be capable, from the inherent difficulty of the subject, of being defined, or ascertained in all cases with perfect certainty.  But the lines are generally marked out with sufficient broadness and clearness; and in the progress of the development of the peculiar functions of each, the part of true wisdom would seem to be, to leave in every practicable direction a wide, if not an unmeasured, distance between the actual exercise of the sovereignty of each.  In every complicated machine slight causes may disturb the operations; and it is often more easy to detect the defects, than to apply a safe and adequate remedy.

    § 188.  IV. From the foregoing considerations we deduce the conclusion, that as a frame or fundamental law of government, (2.) The constitution of the United States is to receive a reasonable interpretation of its language, and its powers, keeping in view the objects and purposes, for which those powers were conferred.  By a reasonable interpretation, we mean, that in case the words are susceptible of two different senses, the one strict, the other more enlarged, that should be adopted, which is most consonant with the apparent objects and intent of the constitution; that which will give it efficacy and force, as a government, rather than that, which will impair its operations, and reduce it to a state of imbecility.  Of course we do not mean, that the words for this purpose are to be strained beyond their common and natural sense; but keeping within that limit, the exposition is to have a fair and just latitude, so as on the one hand to avoid obvious mischief, and on the other hand to promote the public good.

    § 189.  This consideration is of great importance in construing a frame of government; and à fortiori a frame of government, the free and voluntary institution of the people for their common benefit, security, and happiness.  It is wholly unlike the case of a municipal charter, or a private grant, in respect both to its means and its ends.  When a person makes a private grant of a particular thing, or of a license to do a thing, or of an easement for the exclusive benefit of the grantee, we naturally confine the terms, however general, to the objects clearly in the view of the parties.  But even in such cases, doubtful words, within the scope of those objects, are construed most favorably for the grantee; because, though in derogation of the rights of the grantor, they are promotive of the general rights secured to the grantee.  But, where the grant enures, solely and exclusively, for the benefit of the grantor himself, no one would deny the propriety of giving to the words of the grant a benign and liberal interpretation.  In cases, however, of private grants, the objects generally are few; they are certain; they are limited; they neither require, nor look to a variety of means or changes, which are to control, or modify either the end, or the means.

    § 190.  But a constitution of government, founded by the people for themselves and their posterity, and for objects of the most momentous nature, for perpetual union, for the establishment of justice, for the general welfare, and for a perpetuation of the blessings of liberty, necessarily requires, that every interpretation of its powers should have a constant reference to these objects.  No interpretation of the words, in which those powers are granted, can be a sound one, which narrows down their ordinary import, so as to defeat those objects.  That would be to destroy the spirit, and to cramp the letter.  It has been justly observed, by the Supreme Court, that "the constitution unavoidably deals in general language.  It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specification of its powers, or to declare the means, by which those powers should be carried into execution.  It was foreseen, that it would be a perilous, and difficult, if not an impracticable task.  The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years; but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence.  It could not be foreseen, what new changes and modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter; and restrictions and specifications, which at the present might seem salutary, might in the end prove the overthrow of the system itself.  Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom and the public interests should require."  Language to the same effect will be found in other judgments of the same tribunal.

    § 191.  V. Where the power is granted in general terms, the power is to be construed, as co-extensive with the terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible from the context.  We do not mean to assert, that it is necessary, that such restriction should be expressly found in the context.  It will be sufficient, if it arise by necessary implication.  But it is not sufficient to show, that there was, or might have been, a sound or probable motive to restrict it.  A restriction founded on conjecture is wholly inadmissible.  The reason is obvious: the text was adopted by the people in its obvious, and general sense.  We have no means of knowing, that any particular gloss, short of this sense, was either contemplated, or approved by the people; and such a gloss might, though satisfactory in one state, have been the very ground of objection in another.  It might have formed a motive to reject it in one, and to adopt it in another.  The sense of a part of the people has no title to be deemed the sense of the whole.  Motives of state policy, or state interest, may properly have influence in the question of ratifying it; but the constitution itself must be expounded, as it stands; and not as that policy, or that interest may seem now to dictate.  We are to construe, and not to frame the instrument.

    § 192.  VI. A power, given in general terms, is not to be restricted to particular cases, merely because it may be susceptible of abuse, and, if abused, may lead to mischievous consequences.  This argument is often used in public debate; and in its common aspect addressed itself so much to popular fears and prejudices, that it insensibly acquires a weight in the public mind, to which it is no wise entitled.  The argument ab inconvenienti is sufficiently open to question, from the laxity of application, as well as of opinion, to which it leads.  But the argument from a possible abuse of a power against its existence or use, is, in its nature, not only perilous, but, in respect to governments, would shake their very foundation.  Every form of government unavoidably includes a grant of some discretionary powers.  It would be wholly imbecile without them.  It is impossible to foresee all the exigencies, which may arise in the progress of events, connected with the rights, duties, and operations of a government.  If they could be foreseen, it would be impossible ab ante to provide for them.  The means must be subject to perpetual modification, and change; they must be adapted to the existing manners, habits, and institutions of society, which are never stationary; to the pressure of dangers, or necessities; to the ends in view; to general and permanent operations, as well as to fugitive and extraordinary emergencies.  In short, if the whole society is not to be revolutionized at every critical period, and remodeled in every generation, there must be left to those, who administer the government, a very large mass of discretionary powers, capable of greater or less actual expansion according to circumstances, and sufficiently flexible not to involve the nation in utter destruction from the rigid limitations imposed upon it by an improvident jealousy.  Every power, however limited, as well as broad, is in its own nature susceptible of abuse.  No constitution can provide perfect guards against it.  Confidence must be reposed some where; and in free governments, the ordinary securities against abuse are found in the responsibility of rulers to the people, and in the just exercise of their elective franchise; and ultimately in the sovereign power of change belonging to them, in cases requiring extraordinary remedies.  Few cases are to be supposed, in which a power, however general, will be exerted for the permanent oppression of the people.  And yet, cases may easily be put, in which a limitation upon such a power might be found in practice to work mischief; to incite foreign aggression; or encourage domestic disorder.  The power of taxation, for instance, may be carried to a ruinous excess; and yet, a limitation upon that power might, in a given case, involve the destruction of the independence of the country.

    § 193.  VII. On the other hand, a rule of equal importance is, not to enlarge the construction of a given power beyond the fair scope of its terms, merely because the restriction is inconvenient, impolitic, or even mischievous.  If it be mischievous, the power of redressing the evil lies with the people by an exercise of the power of amendment.  If they do not choose to apply the remedy, it may fairly be presumed, that the mischief is less than what would arise from a further extension of the power; or that it is the least of two evils.  Nor should it ever be lost sight of, that the government of the United States is one of limited and enumerated powers; and that a departure from the true import and sense of its powers is, pro tanto, the establishment of a new constitution.  It is doing for the people, what they have not chosen to do for themselves.  It is usurping the functions of a legislator, and deserting those of an expounder of the law.  Arguments drawn from impolicy or inconvenience ought here to be of no weight.  The only sound principle is to declare, ita lex scripta est, to follow, and to obey.  Nor, if a principle so just and conclusive could be overlooked, could there well be found a more unsafe guide in practice, than mere policy and convenience.  Men on such subjects complexionally differ from each other.  The same men differ from themselves at different times.  Temporary delusions, prejudices, excitements, and objects have irresistible influence in mere questions of policy.  And the policy of one age may ill suit the wishes, or the policy of another.  The constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations.  It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction.  It should be, so far at least as human infirmity will allow, not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

    § 194.  VIII. No construction of a given power is to be allowed, which plainly defeats, or impairs its avowed objects.  If, therefore, the words are fairly susceptible of two interpretations, according to their common sense and use, the one of which would defeat one, or all of the objects, for which it was obviously given, and the other of which would preserve and promote all, the former interpretation ought to be rejected, and the latter be held the true interpretation.  This rule results from the dictates of mere common sense; for every instrument ought to be so construed, ut magis valeat, quam pereat.  For instance, the constitution confers on congress the power to declare war.  Now the word declare has several senses.  It may mean to proclaim, or publish.  But no person would imagine, that this was the whole sense, in which the word is used in this connexion.  It should be interpreted in the sense, in which the phrase is used among nations, when applied to such a subject matter.  A power to declare war is a power to make, and carry on war.  It is not a mere power to make known an existing thing, but to give life and effect to the thing itself.  The true doctrine has been expressed by the Supreme Court: "If from the imperfection of human language there should be any serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, the objects, for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction."

    § 195.  IX. Where a power is remedial in its nature, there is much reason to contend, that it ought to be construed liberally.  That was the doctrine of Mr. Chief Justice Jay, in Chisholm v. Georgia; and it is generally adopted in the interpretation of laws.  But this liberality of exposition is clearly inadmissible, if it extends beyond the just and ordinary sense of the terms.

    § 196.  X. In the interpretation of a power, all the ordinary and appropriate means to execute it are to be deemed a part of the power itself.  This results from the very nature and design of a constitution.  In giving the power, it does not extend to limit it to any one mode of exercising it, exclusive of all others.  It must be obvious, (as has been already suggested,) that the means of carrying into effect the objects of a power may, nay, must be varied, in order to adapt themselves to the exigencies of the nation at different times.  A mode efficacious and useful in one age, or under one posture of circumstances, may be wholly vain, or even mischievous at another time.  Government pre-supposes the existence of a perpetual mutability in its own operations on those, who are its subjects; and a perpetual flexibility in adapting itself to their wants, their interests, their habits, their occupations, and their infirmities.

    § 197.  XI. And this leads us to remark, in the next place, that in the interpretation of the constitution there is no solid objection to implied powers.  Had the faculties of man been competent to the framing of a system of government, which would leave nothing to implication, it cannot be doubted, that the effort would have been made by the framers of our constitution.  The fact, however, is otherwise.  There is not in the whole of that admirable instrument a grant of powers, which does not draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to their exercise; not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and subordinate.  There is no phrase in it, which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental and implied powers, and which requires, that every thing granted shall be expressly and minutely described.  Even the tenth amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies, which had been excited, omits the word "expressly," (which was contained in the articles of confederation,) and declares only, that "the powers, not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people;" thus leaving the question, whether the particular power, which may become the subject of contest, has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend upon a fair construction of the whole instrument.  The men, who drew and adopted this amendment, had experienced the embarrassments, resulting from the insertion of this word in the articles of confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments.  A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions, of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means, by which these may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.  It would probably never be understood by the public.  Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients, which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of those objects themselves.  That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.  Why, else, were some of the limitations, found in the ninth section of the first article, introduced?  It is also, in some degree, warranted, by their having omitted to use any restrictive term, which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation.  In considering this point, we should never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.


    § 207.  XIII.  Another rule of interpretation deserves consideration in regard to the constitution.  There are certain maxims, which have found their way, not only into judicial discussions, but into the business of common life, as founded in common sense, and common convenience.  Thus, it is often said, that in an instrument a specification of particulars is an exclusion of generals; or the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.  Lord Bacon's remark, "that, as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it in cases not enumerated," has been perpetually referred to, as a fine illustration.  These maxims, rightly understood, and rightly applied, undoubtedly furnish safe guides to assist us in the task of exposition.  But they are susceptible of being applied, and indeed are often ingeniously applied, to the subversion of the text, and the objects of the instrument.  Thus, it has been suggested, that an affirmative provision in a particular case excludes the existence of the like provision in every other case; and a negative provision in a particular case admits the existence of the same form in every other case.  Both of these deductions are, or rather may be, unfounded in solid reasoning.  Thus, it was objected to the constitution, that, having provided for the trial by jury in criminal cases, there was an implied exclusion of it in civil cases.  As if there was not an essential difference between silence and abolition, between a positive adoption of it in one class of cases, and a discretionary right (it being clearly within the reach of the judicial power confided to the Union) to adopt, or reject it in all or any other cases.  One might with just as much propriety hold, that, because congress have power" to declare war," but no power is expressly given to make peace, the latter is excluded; or that, because it is declared, that "no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law shall be passed" by congress, therefore congress possess in all other cases the right to pass any laws.  The truth is, that in order to ascertain, how far an affirmative or negative provision excludes, or implies others, we must look to the nature of the provision, the subject matter, the objects, and the scope of the instrument.  These, and these only, can properly determine the rule of construction.  There can be no doubt, that an affirmative grant of powers in many cases will imply an exclusion of all others.  As, for instance, the constitution declares, that the powers of congress shall extend to certain enumerated cases.  This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretensions to a general legislative authority.  Why?  Because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority were intended.  In relation, then, to such a subject as a constitution, the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical or artificial rules, is the true criterion of construction.

    § 208.  XIV.  Another rule of interpretation of the constitution, suggested by the foregoing, is, that the natural import of a single clause is not to be narrowed, so as to exclude implied powers resulting from its character, simply because there is another clause, which enumerates certain powers, which might otherwise be deemed implied powers within its scope; for in such cases we are not, as a matter of course, to assume, that the affirmative specification excludes all other implications.  This rule has been put in a clear and just light by one of our most distinguished statesmen; and his illustration will be more satisfactory, perhaps, than any other, which can be offered.  "The constitution," says he, "vests in congress, expressly, the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and the power to regulate trade.  That the former power, if not particularly expressed, would have been included in the latter, as one of the objects of a general power to regulate trade, is not necessarily impugned by its being so expressed.  Examples of this sort cannot sometimes be easily avoided, and are to be seen elsewhere in the constitution.  Thus, the power 'to define and punish offences against the law of nations' includes the power, afterwards particularly expressed, 'to make rules concerning captures,' & c. from offending neutrals.  So, also, a power 'to coin money' would, doubtless, include that of 'regulating its value,' had not the latter power been expressly inserted.  The term taxes, if standing alone, would certainly have included 'duties, imposts, and excises.'  In another clause it is said, 'no tax or duty shall be laid on exports.'  Here the two terms are used as synonymous.  And in another clause, where it is said 'no state shall lay any imposts or duties,' & c. the terms imposts and duties are synonymous.  Pleonasms, tautologies, and the promiscuous use of terms and phrases, differing in their shades of meaning, (always to be expounded with reference to the context, and under the control of the general character and scope of the instrument, in which they are found,) are to be ascribed, sometimes to the purposes of greater caution, sometimes to the imperfection of language, and sometimes to the imperfection of man himself.  In this view of the subject it was quite natural, however certainly the power to regulate trade might include a power to impose duties on it, not to omit it in a clause enumerating the several modes of revenue authorized by the construction.  In few cases could the rule, ex majori cautela, occur with more claim to respect."

    § 209.  We may close this view of some of the more important rules to be employed in the interpretation of the constitution, by adverting to a few belonging to mere verbal criticism, which are indeed but corollaries from what has been said, and have been already alluded to; but which, at the same time, it may be of some use again distinctly to enunciate.

    § 210.  XV. In the first place, then, every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.  Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness, or juridical research.  They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings.  The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss.

    § 211,  XVI. But, in the next place, words, from the necessary imperfection of all human language, acquire different shades of meaning, each of which is equally appropriate, and equally legitimate; each of which recedes in a wider or narrower degree from the others, according to circumstances; and each of which receives from its general use some indefiniteness and obscurity, as to its exact boundary and extent.  We are, indeed, often driven to multiply commentaries from the vagueness of words in themselves; and perhaps still more often from the different manner, in which different minds are accustomed to employ them.  They expand or contract, not only from the conventional modifications introduced by the changes of society; but also from the more loose or more exact uses, to which men of different talents, acquirements, and tastes, from choice or necessity apply them.  No person can fail to remark the gradual deflections in the meaning of words from one age to another; and so constantly is this process going on, that the daily language of life in one generation sometimes requires the aid of a glossary in another.  It has been justly remarked, that no language is so copious, as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea; or so correct, as not to include many, equivocally denoting different ideas.  Hence it must happen, that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms, in which it is delivered.  We must resort then to the context, and shape the particular meaning, so as to make it fit that of the connecting words, and agree with the subject matter.

    § 212.  XVII. In the next place, where technical words are used, the technical meaning is to be applied to them, unless it is repelled by the context.  But the same word often possesses a technical, and a common sense.  In such a case the latter is to be preferred, unless some attendant circumstance points clearly to the former.  No one would doubt, when the constitution has declared, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended," unless under peculiar circumstances, that it referred, not to every sort of writ, which has acquired that name; but to that, which has been emphatically so called, on account of its remedial power to free a party from arbitrary imprisonment.  So, again, when it declares, that in suits at common law, & c. the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, though the phrase "common law" admits of different meanings, no one can doubt, that it is used in a technical sense.  When, again, it declares, that congress shall have power to provide a navy, we readily comprehend, that authority is given to construct, prepare, or in any other manner to obtain a navy.  But when congress is further authorized to provide for calling forth the militia, we perceive at once, that the word "provide" is used in a somewhat different sense.

    § 213.  XVIII.  And this leads us to remark, in the next place, that it is by no means a correct rule of interpretation to construe the same word in the same sense, wherever it occurs in the same instrument.  It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one connexion in the constitution, with a definite sense, therefore the same sense is to be adopted in every other connexion, in which it occurs.  This would be to suppose, that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners.  And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism.  Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the constitution a word used in some sense, which falls in with their favourite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard, by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument.  They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procustes, lopping off its meaning, when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short.  They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled, where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions.  It was very justly observed by the Supreme Court, "that the same words have not necessarily the same meaning attached to them, when found in different parts of the same instrument.  Their meaning is controlled by the context.  This is undoubtedly true.  In common language, the same word has various meanings; and the peculiar sense, in which it is used in any sentence, is to be determined by the context."  A very easy example of this sort will be found in the use of the word "establish," which is found in various places in the constitution.  Thus, in the preamble, one object of the constitution is avowed to be "to establish justice," which seems here to mean to settle firmly, to fix unalterably, or rather, perhaps, as justice, abstractly considered, must be considered as for ever fixed and unalterable, to dispense or administer justice.  Again, the constitution declares, that congress shall have power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies," where it is manifestly used as equivalent to make, or form, and not to fix or settle unalterably and forever.  Again, "congress shall have power to establish post-offices and post-roads," where the appropriate sense would seem to be to create, to found, and to regulate, not so much with a view to permanence of form, as to convenience of action.  Again, it is declared, that "congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," which seems to prohibit any laws, which shall recognise, found, confirm, or patronize any particular religion, or form of religion, whether permanent or temporary, whether already existing, or to arise in future.  In this clause, establishment seems equivalent in meaning to settlement, recognition, or support.  And again, in the preamble, it is said, "We, the people, & c. do ordain and establish this constitution," & c. where the most appropriate sense seems to be to create, to ratify, and to confirm.  So, the word "state" will be found used in the constitution in all the various senses, to which it is commonly applied.  It sometimes means, the separate sections of territory occupied by the political societies within each; sometimes the particular governments established by these societies; sometimes these societies as organized into these particular governments; and lastly, sometimes the people composing these political societies in their highest sovereign capacity.

    § 214.  XIX. But the most important rule, in cases of this nature, is, that a constitution of government does not, and cannot, from its nature, depend in any great degree upon mere verbal criticism, or upon the import of single words.  Such criticism may not be wholly without use; it may sometimes illustrate, or unfold the appropriate sense; but unless it stands well with the context and subject-matter, it must yield to the latter.  While, then, we may well resort to the meaning of single words to assist our inquiries, we should never forget, that it is an instrument of government we are to construe; and, as has been already stated, that must be the truest exposition, which best harmonizes with its design, its objects, and its general structure.

    § 215.  The remark of Mr. Burke may, with a very slight change of phrase, be addressed as an admonition to all those, who are called upon to frame, or to interpret a constitution.  Government is a practical thing made for the happiness of mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity to gratify the schemes of visionary politicians.  The business of those, who are called to administer it, is to rule, and not to wrangle.  It would be a poor compensation, that we had triumphed in a dispute, whilst we had lost an empire; that we had frittered down a power, and at the same time had destroyed the republic.

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